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[L. A. No. 19063. In Bank. June 2!l. 1!l4!>.]

BYRON PEEBLER et a1., Respondents, v. B. C. OLDS
et a1., Appellants.
[1J Appeal-Briefs-Relief from Default.-An appellant 11 days
in default in filing his brief at the time of filing a motion to
dismiss was relieved of his default where the failure to explain
such delay and his further delay were attributable to a motion
to strike the reporter's transeript filed with the motion to dis- ,
miss, and where a brief had been served and was tendered for I
filing at the time of the argument on the motions. (Rules on
Appeal. rule 17(a).)
licK. Dig. References: [1] Appeal and Error, § 902; [2J Appeal

and Error, § 770; [3] Appeal and Error, § 820.L
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(2(, f'.2d ~56: 16() P.2d 54S}

[2J Yd. - Record - Alternative Method - Relief from Default.Und!'r t.he former rulp~ of appeal by which a deJay in j!'ivinJ! a
noti('(' requestin~ a report('r'!; trnn!;cript couJd be' excuReo by
the trial c011rt, it WItR not an abuse of discretion to relieve
from 8evprlll months' delay duE' to objection!; to a bill of ex('eption!; lino the absence of the trial .ill0!r(' bf'cans(' of iIlneRR,
[8] Yd. - Record - Objections - Relief from Default.-Unoer the
npw Rules on AppeaJ. thE' r('viewin~ court is ¢ven exelllsivl"
power to grant reJi('f from default occasioneo by noncomplianc(' ther('with.

Motions to strike the reporter's transcript and to dismiss
an appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of 1101'1 AngeleR County. Carl A. St.ut-ame.n, Judge. Motions denied.
J. M. Danziger, in pro. per" for Appellants.
Roland Maxwell for Respondents.
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THE COURT.-The matters before us arise upon an appeal
from. a judgment granting a permanent injunction. On May
26, 1944, the clerk's and reporter's transcripts were fUed in
the reviewing court. On July 6, forty-one days later, respond·
ents noticed a motion to be heard September 27, to strike the
reporter's transcript on the ground that it WRIi not prepared
Rnd certified within the time or in the manner prescribed by
law. Included in the same document and designated t9 be
heard at the same time, was a motion to dismiss'the appeal
for failure of the appellants to file their opening brief.
[1] The time for the filing of an opening brief is prescribed
in rule 16(a) of the Rules on Appeal, and an opening brief not
filed within the thirty-day period there prescribed, or within
any valid extension allowed thereunder, is in default. Therefore, in the absence of any valid extension of time, appellants'
opening brief was due thirty days after filing of the record,
or on June 25, 1944. When respondents on July 6 filed their
motion to dismiss, appellants were in default for a period of
only eleven days. Rule 17(a) provides, in part, that "If the
appellant's opening brief is not fUed within the time prescribed
in subdivision (a) of Rule 16, the clerk of the reviewing court
shall notify the parties by mail that if the brief is not filed
(2] See 2 Oal.Jur. 630.

\
/

~58

)
/

/

f26 ~.2d

within 30 days after the date of mailing of the notification,
the appeal will be diRmiRsed, unless good cause is shown for
relief. . . . " It is thus apparent from rule 17(a) that the
reviewing court has a broad power to grant relief from default. (See, also, rule 53(b).) It is true that the rules contemplate that some explanation be offered for the default.
and while the record herein does not affirmatively reveal any
specific reason for the· eleven-day delay we are satisfied that
the failure to explain the same as well as the further delay in
the filing of the brief, is traceable to the second part of respondents' motion which was directed at the striking of the
reporter's transcript. It is apparent from the record herein
that it was the latter motion which principally absorbed the
attention of the parties.
.AB stated above. when respondents on July 6 moved to dismiss the appeal because of the eleven-day default in the filing
of the opening brief, they also noticed a motion to strike the
reporter's transcript. Both motions, as indicated above, were
designated to be heard on September 27, a period of two and
one-half months in the future. Confronted with this bifurcated motion-a portion of which potentially might alter or
change the nature of the record on which the appeal was to be
presented-any further delay in the filing of appellants' opening brief is understandable and excusable. Obviously'. while
the motion to strike the reporter's transcript was pending appellants could not intelligently prepare their brief for if the
reporter's transcript· were stricken they would have to proceed on the clerk's transcript or judgment roll. The character
of the record would make a material difference in the substance of their brief. While correct practice should have suggested that they seek additional time for the filing of the brief.
particularly when the clerk's transcript was on file and unchallenged. nevertheles.c;, under all the circumstances, the default occurring while appellants were availing themselves of
their right to present their appeal upon a full and proper
record should be relieved. (C/. Riskin v. Towers, 24 CaUd
274, 277 [148 P.2d 611, 153 A.L.R. 442].) After the motion,
the uncertainty arising from the proceedings in connection
with the record offers a reasonable explanation for appellants'
default in the filing of the brief. Moreover, the brief has been
since served on respondents and was tendered for ining at the
time of the oral argument herein. We are of the opinion,
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[26 C.2d 656; 160 ·P.2'tl 545]
----------------_._--_._-------

therefore, that appellants should be relieved of any default
in connection with the filing of their opening brief. and
the same may be filed.
[2] This leaves for consideration the motion to strike the
reporter's transcript. Inasmuch as the notice of appeal. was
filed before the effective date of the new Rules on Appeal, the
law in effect prior thereto governs this motion. (Rule 53 (b) .)
It appears that originally appellants had elected to· appeal on
a bill of exceptions. A period of several months elapsed in
the consideration of objections thereto, proposals for amendment and efforts to terminate the proceeding. Finally, appellants themselves terminated the proceeding and were .allowed
by the trial court ten days within which to give notice requesting a reporter's transcript. Respondents unSuccessfully
attempted to restrain this new proceeding for a record by
petition for a writ of prohibition. (Peebler v. Superior Court,
63 Cal.App.2d 65l [147 P.2d 34].)
.
Under the law in effect prior to the new Rules on Appeal,
the notice requesting a transcript was not jurisdictional, and
delay in giving such notice could be excused by the trial court.
The matter of diligence in preparation of the record was
almost entirely committed to the discretion of the trial court,
and its action in certifying a belatedly prepared· reporter's
transcript t-elieved the appellants from any asserted lack of
diligence. (Troy v. Troy, 127 Cal.App. 489, 492 [16 P.2d
290]; Crocker v. Crocker, 76 Cal.App. 606 [245 P. 438];
Sekt v. Superior Court, 24 Ca1.2d 73, 77 [147 P.2d 568];
Wood v. Peterson Farms Co., 131 Cal.App. 312, ?15 (21 P.2d
468J; Smith v. Jacard, 20 Cal.App. 280 [128 P. 1023, 1026];
Hoknemann v. Pacific Gas ct Elec. Co., 31 Cal.App.2d 692
[88 P.2d 748J.) The record het-ein does not show any abuse of
the trial court's discretion .. The delay consequent upon the
objections to the proposed bill of exceptions and the absence
of the trial judge because of illness furnished sufficient basis
for the trial court's action in relieving appellants from the
e1Iects of the delay in completing the record. The motion to
strike the reporter's transcript must therefore be denied.
[3] In order to obviate contusion, it is well to state that
under the new Rules on Appeal the trial court may extend
time only for limited periods upon application made before the
expiration of any prescribed time. It cannot grant relief from
default. The reviewiDg court is given exclusive powel' to do
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so. (Rules on Appeal, rule 53(b); Averill v. Lincoln, 24 Cal.
2d 761, 763 [151 P.2d 119]; Jarkieh v. Badagliacco, 68 Cal.
App.2d 426, 430 [156 P.2d 969]; 17 So.Cal.L.Rev. 232,
292.)
For the foregoing reasons, the motions to strike the reporter's transcript and to dismiss the appeal are denied.

)

TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent from that part of the majority
opinion dealing with the granting of relief frGm appellant's
conceded default in the filing of his opening brief. It fails
to meet the basic issue in this proceeding, for it considers the
problem as if the default took place in the course of an appeal
pending in this court. If this were the case, and appellant's
request for relief from default were addressed to us, it would
be entirely appropriate to consider his excuses, and either
grant or deny relief in our own discretion. The appeal was
pending, however, in the District Court of Appeal, Second
Appellate District, Division Two, for determination, and the
record and briefs had to be filed in that court. The delays and
default took place there; the motion to dismiss the appeal was
made in that court, argued there, and decided, after submission, by a written opinion. A petition for hearing was thereafter filed and granted by this court.
.
The Rules on Appeal recognize, of course, that the "reviewing court," which has the power to grant or deny relief from
default, is the court in which the appeal is pending. (Rule
40(b).) Hence, the power to relieve from default in the instant case originally resided in the District Court of Appeal.
In its decision granting the motion to dismiss and in the accompanying opinion, that court set forth its determination
that appellant's neglect was inexcusable and did not justify
relief. The question before us is not, therefore, as the majority opinion assumes, what showing must be made by an appellant to call for the exercise of our discretion to grant relief from a default, but a much more important question: to
what extent will the Supreme Court undertake to regulate the
exercise of such discretion by the District Court of Appeal'
When the petition for hearing in this court was granted,
the decision and opinion of the District Court of Appeal were,
of course, superseded, and the case was set at large for a Dew
and .independent decision by the Supreme Court. This court
the~pl: became the reviewing court, with the same power to
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grant or deny relief from default as if the case had originally
been appealed here. (Rule 40(b).) It does not follow, however, that in the exercise of this power we should entirely ignore the action previously taken by the District Court of
Appeal, and attach no presumption of correctness to the conclusion reached by that court after mature consideration of
the record and argument presented to it. In following that
course the majority opinion simply advises the District Court
of Appeal that its determination of procedural matters within
its jurisdiction is entitled to no weight. This view is in striking contrast to the deference that this court showed to the
superior courts during the period preceding the new Rules
on Appeal, when those courts had power to relieve from defaults in connection with the record. The rule was established by many well considered discussions, some of which
are cited in the majority opinion, that the trial judge had
a broad discretion in these matters, and that on an appeal
or other proceeding to review his determination, that discretion was to be upheld unless plainly abusea.
If we adhere, as I think we should, to this traditional approach, it would seem to follow that the respective functions
of the District Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court in
the situation before us may thus be differentiated: (1) On the
meaning and effect of a rule, a question of law, this court
should exercise its usual reviewing power regarding any petition for hearing after Ii decision by the District Court of
Appeal. (2) When the issue is whether the party has in fact
complied with a particular rule, this court should likewise
exercise its usual reviewing power. (3) If it appears from
the record, however, that the party is actually in default by
his failure to comply with a rule, and has sought to be relieved from such default, the decision of the appellate court
in the exercise of its discretion in granting or refusing such
relief should not be disturbed except where there is manifest
miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, our task here was to
decide whether the appellate court had plainly abused its
discretion under the circumstances of this case, and such a
conclusion could only be reached if it appeared that the appellants had so persuasive a reason for their failure to file
the opening brief that it necessarily called for an application of the power to grant relief.
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The majority opinion does not suggest that any such showing
was made; it does not recite all of the circumstances and COIl·
siderations that impelled the District Court of Appeal to dis·
miss the appeal. This method of handling the case may well
prove to be an unfortunate precedent. I am entirely in sympathy with the view that hearings on the merits should be
encouraged and that excusable neglect should be relieved by
the appellate court having jurisdiction of the appeal. But
it is of equal importance to litigants and the courts that dilatory tactics of counsel be discouraged and that the appellate
courts not be hampered in carrying out their duties.
The appellants have offered two reasons for their neglect.
They contend that they were not ~ctually in default, since the
District Court of Appeal clerk failed to give the notice under
rule 17 (a). This misconception finds no justification in the
rule and is contrary to the holdings of prior cases. (See Peak
v. Nicholson, 61 Cal.App.2d 355, 359 [143 P.2d 7S]; Witkin,
New California Rules on Appeal, 17 So.Cal.L.Rev. SO, 142.)
Accordingly appellant's conduct must be regarded, not as
the result of an excusable mistake, but as a plain disregard
of the rule.
The other explanation offered by appellants is that while
the dispute concerning the record was in progress, they were
llncertain as to whether they would eventually obtain a reporter's transcript or would be compelled to take their appeal
solely on a clerk's transcript, and that this uncertainty made
it impossible for them to write an opening brief with reference
to the actual record in the case. Had this explanation been
addressed to the appellate court by way of a request for extension of time (see rule 16(a» it would undoubtedly have
been favorably received. A sound reason for requesting an
extension of time, however, is not a justification for completely disregarding the rule. It is commonplace in all practice that the party whose time is running on the many steps
.required in trial and appellate procedure, and who has a
good ground for extension of that time, must present it before
his time expires. Otherwise his position becomes entirely
different, and his only recourse is to seek relief from his default by a showing that he allowed the time to run against him
by inadvertence or excusable neglect. There is no such showing in the instant ca.~e. Appellants, insisting upon an errone-
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------------------------------------ous int.erpretation of the rules, have deliberately failed to
comply with their plain language. Previous delays occasioned
by disputes over the record had already resulted in postponing the hearing on the appeal for over a year, and it was incumbent upon appellants to exercise reasonable diligence to
avoid additional delays.
It appears, therefore, that the District Court of Appeal
acted well within the limits of its discretion in denying appellants relief from their default in failing to file their opening brief on time.
Every court, and in particular every reviewing court, bears
a heavy responsibility for the prompt and efficient handling of
its business, and it can discharge that responsibility only if
it is permitted a reasonable discretion and control over its
affairs. The new Rules on Appeal are designed to secure the
speedy determination of appeals (see rule 53 (a» and to that
end each appellate court is given supervisory power over the
procedural steps in the taking of appeals. The Supreme Court
should not undertake to reexamine the various considerations
that enter into the discretionary determination to grant or
deny relief from default. The appellate courts cannot successfully carry out their duties if such determinations are'
subject to an independent review and reconsideration by the
Supreme Court.
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